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Abstract 
Since the uprising in 2011, Tunisia is seen as a political lab whose experiences impact the entire 
region. The return to the political scene of the Islamists of the Ennahdha Party, and their democratic 
ascension to power, came as a surprise, if not a shock, to many international and local observers. The 
party became a key actor beyond national borders and took a step further by marking its 10th Congress 
with the announcement of the separation of its political and religious activities.  The Tunisian 
experience is represented as an example for other Islamist parties so should we see the secularization 
of Ennahdha’s discourse as being at the forefront of the Islamist movement? Or has the party already 
gone beyond Islamism, and in fact created a rupture with other Islamist parties?  Re-branding does not 
imply a change in ideology but a change of perception, inside and outside the party.  This analysis 
looks at the perception of the reform intended by Ennahdha from the point of view of foreign islamist 
parties in the context of the 10th Party Congress in May 2016 
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the foreign Islamist parties. 
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Muslim Democrats Beyond Islamism 
The 10th Congress of the Tunisian Islamist Party Ennahdha was held in May 2016 in Hammamet and 
Tunis. The Congress occurred in a challenging security, political and economic context on both local 
and international levels. Tunisia is under scrutiny internationally and locally, thus the Islamist party 
Congress attracted a very large number of foreign guests, among which were key leaders of other 
Muslim-based political parties.  
Ennhadha’s1 communication strategy  has turned towards the rebranding of party members as 
“Muslim Democrats”. The strategy of the Party was clearly announced in the program: “(…) the 
Ennahdha movement aims at renewing its party in order to increase its popularity, as a democratic 
political party, open and entrenched in Islamic references as defined in the 2014 Constitution (…)”.  
Re-branding does not imply a change in ideology but a change in perception, inside and 
outside the party.  This new label is in fact the crystallization of a long process that started in the early 
days of the party. The moment of rebranding has been seen by much of the media and other observers 
as a fracture or “a profound transformation of the party’s identity”. In fact, the party’s inclination 
towards reform and adaptation has been shaped by its experience of alternating sequences of power 
and oppression since its creation in the late 1980s
2.  The party’s leadership has developed a pragmatic 
approach to politics and become a fine player of the democratic game. 
 Ennahdha’s “Islamism” is not, and almost never was, the expression of an anti-modern 
objection to the West or to non-Muslims.  In the current context, which allows the perilous, simplistic 
and quasi-exclusive association of the terms “Islamism” and “terrorism”, the party decided to finally 
drop its “Islamist self” to become “Muslim democrat”. The secularization of the party is a pragmatic 
move: a rubber stamp of the transition from oppositional repressed party to a leading democratic actor 
with the prospect of future victory.  
 
Secularization of the Party 
The secularization of the party is observed through the lens of the approval of the separation between 
religious and political activities by the 1,200 party delegates present at the Congress. The motion was 
accepted with an 80% share of the vote
3
.  This vote was the final stage of a process that started a few 
years ago. In practice, the leadership dragged its constituents, including those on the margins, along 
with them in a top-down mechanism. In London, in the days preceding its return to Tunisia in January 
2011, Rached Ghannouchi (the party’s leader and founder) declared that sharia was not for Tunisia. 
Since then, the leadership of the Party has paved the way for post-Islamist politics (Bayat 2013), 
encapsulated in the self-defined label of “Muslims Democrats”.  
In the opening discourse of the Congress, Ghannouchi pushed his logic one step further by 
asserting that Ennahdha’s move was in fact the reclaiming of its true democratic and civil identity: 
“Despotic regimes disfigured Ennahdha’s relationship with the State through repression, defamation 
and fear-mongering. (…) The Tunisian state is our ship which must carry all Tunisian men and women 
(…)”4.  Ennahdha is still seeking recognition, and wants to  be seen as a credible democratic force by 
secular and religious parties. The Congress was organised as a gigantic demonstration of this potential.  
                                                     
1 http://www.ennahdha.tn/ Last access 27th March 2017. 
2 The Islamic Tendency Movement or Mouvement de la tendance islamique was created in 1981, subsequently the party’s 
name changed, in 1989, to Hizb Ennahdha or Renaissance Party.  
3
 http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2016/05/23/ennahda-a-du-mal-a-convaincre-les-tunisiens 
  -de-sa-prise-de-distance-avec-l-islam-politique_4924562_3210.html. Consulted on 29th October 2016. 
4 Opening discourse of Rached Ghannouchi May 21st 2016, published on the Ennahdha International Party (Official) 
Facebook page. 
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In the months following the official decision of “political specialisation” as framed by Ferjani 
Said
5
, a leading member of the party, changes are slowly being made within the party membership, 
including the opening of party leadership and membership to non-(practicing) Muslims
6
 and the 
resignation of members also active in civil society from leadership positions. “Secularisation is not the 
way we see this. We are pragmatic; we are a modern political party: Muslim, Tunisian and democrat. 
(…) We reform ourselves and we make an example”.   
 
(Dis-)Credibility  
The French Manichean view of religious parties classified Ennahdha on the side of right-wing 
extremism. Islamism has often been associated with obscurantism by the media or politicians. During 
the election that saw the victory of Nidaa Tounes in 2015, the French media were celebrating the 
victory of the “laic against the secular”7. At variance with this is the view that, Ennahdha is a living 
example of a leading Islamist party empowered by the people’s revolution, riding the wave of political 
change.   
During all the interviews given by party members, the emphasis has been put deliberately on 
the idea of “mutation”, “reform” or “novelty”.  These semantic choices are a clear reflexion of the 
party’s challenge to obtain a validation of its democratic image by foreign observers.  This 
communication strategy has been greeted with an almost united voice, coming from both religious and 
non-religious actors, as an opportunist and illusory manoeuvre. 
Ennahdha’s message was a surprise to several observers and generated much suspicion. The 
French media, at the forefront of the criticism of faith based parties, have generally portrayed this 
move as an historical fracture. For western media, integration to the democratic scene should be 
conditioned by the renunciation of a religious repertoire. In Europe there is a plethora of religious 
inspired or faith based parties, existing on both sides of the classical right-left political divide; their 
religious reference is not perceived to undermine their “democratic” credentials. But the local myths 
of a “salafi invasion of the French Riviera”8 and the idea according which “the wave of refugees 
would increase the terrorist threat”9 have impacted the global analysis of political Islam, and enhanced 
the suspicion built around the party. 
It is worth recording that if religious activities are essential to Islamist parties they are only 
one aspect of the project. In fact, religious activities are the main spectre under which Ennahdha has 
been discredited or celebrated.  The re-labelling of the party does not imply a separation from its 
religious base or constituency, and that relative separation is difficult for both insiders and outsiders to 
understand. The de facto religious base and inspiration is one that nurtures the suspicion of secular 
parties and observers, according to whom the re-labelling of Ennahdha would reveal the rhetorical 
attempt of a hidden agenda. Interestingly, the idea of Ennahdha’s double discourse is also shared by 
other Islamist parties. 
 
                                                     
5 Said Ferjani, regular discussions in May 2016, interviewed on 19th October 2016 
6 The Party already has, at leadership level, women who do not wear the hijab, and former members of non-religious parties 
such as Aroua Ben Abbès, elected assembly representative for Tunis 2 and appointed member of the Shura council in 
July 2016. 
7 See the 2014 election result headlines for Le Figaro http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2014/10/27/01003-
20141027ARTFIG00315-en-tunisie-la-victoire-des-seculiers.php. Another interesting analysis of the perception of Nidaa 
Tounes by French Media was published by the Al Huffington Post http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2014/10/29/nida-
tounes-medias-francais_n_6067174.html, and BFMTV http://www.bfmtv.com/international/tunisie-l-alliance-laique-
nida-842703.html; all sources accessed on 27th March 2017. 
8 Henry Laurens, historian at the College de France, explains the conspiracy theories surrounding the Muslim communities in 
France and the great “Salafi invasion of the beaches of South of France”, CCMO conference, Paris 26th October 2016. 
9 The most illustrative example of this being the recent  poster campaign organised by the mayor of Beziers in the south of 
France, Robert Ménard, featuring the slogan “They are arriving, the State imposes them on us”. 
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/beziers-ils-arrivent-la-nouvelle-affiche-anti-migrants-de-robert-
menard_1839690.html. last accessed 27th March 2017. 
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The( Im)possible Reform: Malaysia, Bangladesh and Sudan 
Islamist parties in Muslim majority countries place Ennahdha at the forefront of the Islamic struggle. 
The reputation of the party is partially based on the recognition of the intellectual quality of Rached 
Ghannouchi. Most, including the Malaysian Islamist Party (PAS) and its off-spring Amanah, and the 
Jamaat Islami of Bangladesh, or the Popular Congress Party of Sudan (PCP). see the Tunisian 
revolution as the way forward to implement an Islamic political model. The failure of the Egyptian 
Muslim brothers has increased the attention devoted to Ennahdha.  As explained by Abdur Razzaq
10
, 
Assistant Secretary General of the Jamaat Islami Bangladesh “Ghannouchi’s position as politician and 
thinker in the Muslim World is unique. While the Arab Spring has failed across the Arab world, 
Tunisia is perhaps the only success story, and this has become possible because of Ghannouchi’s 
farsightedness and deep understanding of Islam and the complexities of the politics of the present-day 
world. Ennahdha is undoubtedly a leading example in today’s Muslim world, although there is room 
for different and divergent views”.  
Islamists leaders like Abdur Razzaq (Bangladesh), Rached Ghannoucchi (Tunisia), Dzulkefly 
Ahmad
11
 or Anwar Ibrahim
12
 (Malaysia) entered into contact with the Islamist scene in London in the 
1970s-1980s. At that time, the governments of newly decolonized or developing countries were 
offering scholarships to study in the UK. Thus, London became an Islamist hub, where young 
Muslims from all over the world came into contact with each other and eventually developed a 
stronger political awareness
13
. Other encounters occurred in the 1990s, when several Tunisian Islamist 
leaders left for London to seek political asylum.  
 
Divorcing Religion 
 From Bangladesh to Sudan and Malaysia, Islamist parties inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood have 
made social welfare and religious activities the pillar of their projects.  On its website the Jamaat 
explains its objective of “developing and supporting society through the work of social purification, 
morale reconstruction and social services, on the basis of Islamic values.”14  The Malaysian Islamist 
party was created in 1951 and brings together more than a million supporters. PAS has cultivated very 
strong links to Malaysian civil society and several members are also NGO leaders. Beyond the social 
work being done by these organisations, civil society groups, whether structurally or informally linked 
to Islamist parties, are acting as proxies to support the party agenda (Lemière 2014). Thus, the 
separation announced by Ennahdha is, to other Islamist parties, a renunciation of an ideological pillars 
but also a key source of support.   
 
Renouncing Sharia 
The perspective taken by Ennahdha on sharia is also another problematic issue to most Islamist 
parties. During the Congress, Ibrahim El Sanousi explains that Ennahdha’s move is only a strategy and 
                                                     
10 Abdur Razzaq, Secretary General of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-islami, was interviewed by email on 19th June 2016 and 
stressed that his views, expressed in this paper, do not necessarily reflect the views of the Party. See a short profile 
http://www.aljazeera.com/profile/abdur-razzaq.html. Last accessed 27th March 2017. 
11 Former PAS leader and ideologue, Dr Dzulkefly Ahmad is a former member of parliament for the constituency of Kuala 
Selangor in the State of Selangor (2008-2013). He was one of the founders of the Party Amanah Negara in 2015. Read 
his blog at https://drdzul.com/ 
12 Anwar Ibrahim, former leader of the Islamist movement, then coopted by the government of Mahathir (1982-1998), and 
founder of the multi-ethnic party Keadilan (website http://www.keadilanrakyat.org/). He is the charismatic leader of the 
Malaysian opposition coalition. In 2015, he was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment on charges of sodomy. 
13 See Sophie Lemière, Genesis and development of a non-partisan political actor : the formation of the Jamaah Islah 
Malaysia (JIM) and its roots in Western Europe, Al-Jaami‘ah, Vol. 47, No. 1, 2009 M/1430 H 
https://www.academia.edu/1379084/Genesis_and_Development_of_a_non-
Partisan_Political_Actor_the_Formation_of_the_Jama_ah_Islah_Malaysia_JIM_and_its_Roots_in_Western_Europe last 
access 3rd October 2016 
14 http://www.jamaat-e-islami.org/en/aboutus.php last access 3rd October 2016. The link could not longer be accessed on 
27th March 2017.  
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that, in time, the party will implement sharia when the opportunity presents itself. Sanousi  is the heir 
of Hassan al-Turabi, who created the party in 1999 after defecting from the party of the current 
president, Omar al-Bashir.  
For the Malaysian Islamist Party, sharia is still a priority.  The party is traditionally an 
opposition party that has maintained an ambiguous relationship to the ruling Malay ethno-nationalist 
ruling party (Nawab 2016).  The party rhetoric is entrenched in an anti-western discourse and in 
favour of the implementation of pro-sharia and hudud laws, attached to social reform, in Malaysia 
(despite the fact that Muslims are only 60% of the Malaysian population) . Amanah was created in 
2015 by the moderate branch of PAS and has labelled itself as the most progressive version of PAS.  
Despite its progressive outlook, Khalid Saamad
15
, leader and founder of Amanah, on the secularization 
of Ennahdha’s discourse explains “I don’t know if this should be seen as a step forward or a step 
backward. I believe he is trying to bring the establishment of the principle (of sharia) without labelling 
it as Islamist”16. Amanah party’s ideologue has recently re-discovered and advocated for the maqasid 
al-sharia: the implementation of the higher principles of sharia, rather than its practical translation
17
. 
Despite a genuine ambition of modernisation of Islamic Law, the party has until now failed in taking 
distance from a greater implementation of sharia law in Malaysia
18
 
 
Ennahdha’s Congress has pushed forward its most democratic and secular features. This attempt to 
gain credibility as a competitive democratic player undermines its leadership position of the Islamist 
movement. This reasserts the heterogeneity and plurality of Islamist movements and the relativity of 
their ideological identities to the local context. Said Ferjani explains: “We are not living in an 
ideological cocoon. We do not believe ideology is the main driving force but a component along with 
our constitution, our identity”. 
Through its Congress, Ennahdha has sealed a long process and now needs to maintain its 
credibility towards both Islamist and non-Islamist foreign actors. This hybrid child is a political 
orphan whose identity and claims are seen as suspicious by both secular and religious parties. The 
Tunisian revolution resides also in the perception of its Islamist party, which has evolved beyond the 
frame of Islamism. The striking difference between Ennahdha and other Islamist parties is the 
influence of the European experience:  the return of a new generation of leaders to Tunisia, including 
young women who have been able to bring together traditional religious values and practices and 
secular values, echoing Bourguiba’s inheritance. Sayida Ounissi, former assembly member and current 
Secretary of State, is at the forefront of this new generation of female leaders. She has for long been 
comparing Ennahdha with the Christian Democrat Union of Germany (CDU)
19
.  Attention should be 
given to the younger generation of Islamists as a key influence on the party’s evolution:  the career 
trajectories of the younger generation of leaders, and, specifically, female leaders within Islamist 
parties. The different dynamics existing among the younger generation of Islamists, or Muslims 
democrats from Tunisia to Malaysia, is also a factor contributing to change or stagnation of the 
parties’ rhetoric and ideology. The direction taken by Ennahdha has a great influence on other Islamist 
parties and generates important ideological debates that may or may not be translated into the 
secularisation of their discourse. This evolution is tied to the local context and to the level of 
internationalisation of party members.  
                                                     
15 Khalid Saamad, former central committee member of the Islamist Party of Malaysia (PAS), one of the founders of 
Amanah. 
16 Interviewed on 2nd June 2016. 
17 Abd al-Malik al-JuwaynÏ (d. 478 ah/ 1185 ce), one of the earliest contributors to al-maqasid theory as we know it, today 
uses al-maq¥|id and public interests interchangeably (Auda 2007). A principle defended by Tunisian scholar Tahar Ben 
Achour in the 1960s. 
18 Currently, the Malaysian judicial system is hybrid and the constitution allows the existence of an Islamic judicial system 
(Shafei school of law) dealing solely with family law and offenses related to Islam. PAS has historically pushed for a 
greater application of Sharia and some aspects of Hudud laws, including amputation and whipping. 
19 https://www.brookings.edu/research/ennahda-from-within-islamists-or-muslim-democrats-a-conversation/ Lasted accessed 
18th October 2016. 
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